Adversarial Defense Through Network Profiling Based Path Extraction by Qiu, Yuxian et al.
Adversarial Defense Through Network Profiling Based Path Extraction
Yuxian Qiu§ Jingwen Leng§∗ Cong Guo§
Quan Chen§ Chao Li§ Minyi Guo§∗ Yuhao Zhu†
§Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University
†Department of Computer Science, University of Rochester
{qiuyuxian,leng-jw,guocong}@sjtu.edu.cn,
{chen-quan,lichao,guo-my}@cs.sjtu.edu.cn, yzhu@rochester.edu
Abstract
Recently, researchers have started decomposing deep neu-
ral network models according to their semantics or functions.
Recent work has shown the effectiveness of decomposed func-
tional blocks for defending adversarial attacks, which add
small input perturbation to the input image to fool the DNN
models. This work proposes a profiling-based method to
decompose the DNN models to different functional blocks,
which lead to the effective path as a new approach to explor-
ing DNNs’ internal organization. Specifically, the per-image
effective path can be aggregated to the class-level effective
path, through which we observe that adversarial images acti-
vate effective path different from normal images. We propose
an effective path similarity-based method to detect adversar-
ial images with an interpretable model, which achieve better
accuracy and broader applicability than the state-of-the-art
technique.
1. Introduction
Deep learning (DL) has revolutionized the key applica-
tion domains such computer vision [16], natural-language
processing [35], and automatic speech recognition [1]. DL
models have outperformed traditional machine learning ap-
proaches and even outperformed human beings. Although
most of the current research efforts have been in improving
the efficiency and accuracy of DL models, interpretability
has recently become an increasingly important topic. This is
because many DL-enabled or DL-based systems are mission-
critical systems, such as ADAS [9] and online banking sys-
tems [11]. However, to date, there is no theoretical under-
standing of how DL models work, which is a significant
roadblock in pushing DL into mission-critical systems.
Owing to the lack of interpretability, DL models usually
∗ Jingwen Leng and Minyi Guo are co-corresponding authors of this
paper.
do not have a clear decision boundary and are vulnerable to
the input perturbation. Researches have recently been pro-
posed [29, 24, 18, 6], which can all successfully find a small
perturbation on the input image to fool the DNN based clas-
sifier. There is also prior work that demonstrates the physical
attack feasibility by putting a printed image in front of a stop
sign to mislead a real DNN based traffic sign detector [10].
Last but not least, a DNN model often fails for inputs that
are dramatically different from the training samples. For
example, the classification model used in Tesla’s autopilot
system that incorrectly classified a white truck to cloud [12]
and caused the crash accident.
To address the vulnerability challenge in DL models, this
work proposes the effective path as a new approach to explore
the internal organization of neural networks. The effective
path for an image is a critical set of synapses and neurons
that together lead to the final predicted class. The concept
is similar to the execution path of a control-flow based pro-
gram [3]. We propose an activation based back-propagation
algorithm to extract the image’s effective path, which pre-
serves the critical information in the neural network and
allows us to analyze the inner structures of DNNs.
The derived per-image effective path has direct aggrega-
tion capability. For example, we get per-class effective path
by aggregating the effective path from all training images in
the same class. We can then decompose the entire DNN into
multiple components, each pertaining to an inference class.
We perform similarity analysis and find the phenomenon
called path specialization that different classes activate dis-
tinctive portions of the neural network in the inference task.
On the basis of the observation, we analyze the path simi-
larity between normal and adversarial images, we uncover
that when an adversarial image successfully alters the pre-
diction result by small perturbation, the network activates a
significantly distinctive set of effective path compared to the
training samples, which lays the foundation for defending
the DNN using the effective path.
We propose to use the simple linear combination of an im-
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Figure 1: Examples that illustrate the process of using profiling to extract effective path.
age’s per-layer effective path similarity to detect adversarial
images. Our work can use a simpler linear model to out-
perform the state-of-the-art work [37] for six representative
attack methods. Besides, we also show that our detection
approach generalizes well to those attacks, meaning it can
detect adversarial samples from methods that are not used in
its training process, while the prior work does not have this
level of generalization ability. Moreover, the overhead of
using our approach is also much smaller (up to 500 ×) than
prior work. In the end, we show that the effective path can
not only be used for adversarial image detection but also for
explaining the impact of the training process and network
structure on the DNN’s inference capability.
2. Effective Path via Profiling
Prior work [37] has proposed a method to extract critical
data routing path (CDRP) for DNN models and demonstrated
its usefulness of defending against adversarial samples. How-
ever, deploying it in practice has two major limitations. The
first is the extraction process, which requires inserting con-
trol gates for each layer’s output channel and learning those
gates through retraining. This retraining process needs hyper-
parameter tuning and takes a long time to process a single
image. The second disadvantage is the extracted path rep-
resentation is still high dimensional (1152 for AlexNet and
15104 for ResNet-50). The high dimensional representa-
tion weakens its interpretability and generalization ability to
different adversarial attacks, which we will discuss later.
To overcome those limitations, we propose a novel
method to extract the DNN’s path information for an im-
age. The method is inspired from path profiling in program
analysis [3]: a program is represented in the form of con-
trol flow graph, where a node is a basic block and an edge
is the control flow between basic blocks. Compilers use
path profiling to identify the sequences of frequently exe-
cuted basic blocks, i.e., execution paths in the program. A
program’s path profiling provides useful insights on its exe-
cution and facilitates the understanding of the program. In
this work, we treat a neural network as a dataflow graph
where a node is a neuron and an edge is a synapse (weight)
between two neurons, and apply the profiling technique to
extract its execution path, which we call as effective path to
distinguish from the prior work. In the high level, both them
represent the critical dataflow inside a DNN but our method
doesn’t rely on retraining and the derived representation is
low-dimensional and generic.
2.1. Single Image Extraction
We first explain how to extract the effective path for a
single image, denoted as P = (N ,S,W), which represents
the collection of critical neuronsN , synapses S and weights
W . It can be further broken down to the per-layer formN =
(N 1, . . . , NL), S = (S1, . . . ,SL),W = (W1, . . . ,WL),
where N l represents the important output neurons of layer l,
while Sl andW l represent important synapses and weights.
The extraction process starts at the last layer L and moves
backward to the first layer. In the last layer L, only the neu-
ron corresponding to the predicted class nLp is active and
thus is included in the effective path, i.e., NL = {nLp }. The
important weights form the minimum set of weights that
can contribute more than θ ratio of the output neuron nLp .
Equation 1 formalizes the process, where K˜Lp is a selected
set of weight indices with pre-nonlinearity neuron nLp as
the output, wLk,p is the weight value, and n
L−1
k is the corre-
sponding input neuron value (also the output neuron of layer
l−1). To find the minimum K˜Lp , we can rank the weight and
input neuron pairs by the value of their product and choose
the minimum number of pairs that contribute to more than
threshold θ × nLp .
min
K˜Lp
|K˜Lp |, s.t.
∑
k∈K˜Lp
nL−1k × wLk,p ≥ θ × nLp (1)
WL = {wLk,p|k ∈ K˜Lp } (2)
NL−1 = {nL−1k |k ∈ K˜Lp } (3)
After deriving the weight indices set K˜Lp , we can get the
WL set using Equation 2. Since the last layer is the fully
connected layer and there is a one-to-one mapping between
weight and synapses, SL can also be derived. Meanwhile,
since the output neurons of layer L− 1 are the input neurons
of layerL, it is straightforward to deriveNL−1 in Equation 3.
We then can repeat the process in Equation 1 for every active
neuron in NL−1: each active neuron will result in a set of
weights and their union form theWL−1. The process repeats
backward until the first layer, and yields the whole neuron
set N , synapse set S , and weight setW for the input image.
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Figure 2: Class-wise path
similarity in LeNet.
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when merging per-class path.
Note that the above process addresses the fully connected
layer. To process the convolutional layer, we need to convert
it to FC layer according to each output neuron’s receptive
field as Fig. 1b shows. There are two caveats on handling
the convolutional layer. First, solving of Equation 1 does not
require the ranking of all input neurons but only the neurons
in the receptive field of the output neuron. Second, there is
no one-to-one mapping between synapse and weight because
of weight sharing. As a result, multiple synapses can have
the same active weights in the effective path.
2.2. Multi-Image Aggregation
The derived effective path is a binary mask that indicates
whether a neuron or synapse contributes to the image in-
ference. As such, we can simply aggregate effective paths
from an image group, e.g. images of the same class, to
obtain a larger effective path that provides a higher level
perspective of the whole group. Aggregating the effective
path of two images P(i) and P(j) is essentially taking the
union of N , S andW on each layer, represented by P(i) ∪
P(j) = (N (i)∪N (j),S(i)∪S(j),W(i)∪W(j)) , where
N (i)∪N (j) = (N 1(i)∪N 1(j), . . . ,NL(i)∪NL(j)) (N
andW are similar). This approach can create a meaningful
representation for an image group without increasing its di-
mension. In contrast, the feature dimension of CDRPs [37]
increase linearly with the number of images in the class
because each element in CDRP is a continuous number be-
tween 0 and 10 instead of a binary mask.
In this work, we use two types of aggregated effective
path for the neural network interpretation and defense. For
the class-level perspective, we aggregate all correctly pre-
dicted training images from the class c, denoted by X˜c,
to get the per-class effective path P˜c =
⋃
x∈X˜c P(x); for
the network-level perspective, we aggregate images from
the whole training set X˜ to get the overall effective path
P˜ = ⋃x∈X˜ P(x).
Path Sparsity The derived overall effective path is highly
sparse compared to the full model, indicating that critical
information is reserved. We define the weight (synapse)
density of the effective path DW (DS) as the ratio of its
weights (synapses) over the entire weights (synapses). They
can be calculated in Equation 4, where Wl and W˜ l (Sl and
S˜l) is the layer l’s entire weight (synapse) set and weight
(synapse) set in overall effective path, respectively.
DW =
∑L
l=1
∣∣∣W˜ l∣∣∣∑L
l=1 |Wl|
,DS =
∑L
l=1
∣∣∣S˜l∣∣∣∑L
l=1 |Sl|
(4)
We extracted the overall effective path for popular DNN
models including LeNet-5 [20], AlexNet [17], ResNet-
50 [15], Inception-v4 [36], and VGG-16 [34]. With θ = 0.5,
their synapse densities are 13.8%, 20.5%, 22.2%, 41.7%,
17.2%, respectively. Note that those values are calculated
after aggregating all training samples (i.e. overall effective
path). Prior work CDRP [37] reported similar sparsity values,
which, however, was calculated based on an individual im-
age because different images’ CDRPs cannot be aggregated
directly while effective path can. We also conduct an exper-
iment which shows the DNN accuracy drops immediately
when we start deactivating portions of the effective path,
which indicates that the extracted path is not only sparse but
also representative.
3. Effective Path Visualization
The per-class path dissects the network to different com-
ponents and can be used to understand why the neural net-
work can distinguish different classes and study the impact
of changing the network structure. We perform the path
similarity analysis among different classes, which leads to
a finding called path specialization. Different classes acti-
vate not only sparse but also a distinctive set of neurons and
synapses for the inference task.
We first study the similarity of per-class effective paths.
The similarity between class c1 and c2 is calculated by the
Jaccard coefficient of their synapse set as in Equation 5.
Jc1,c2 = J(S˜c1 , S˜c2) =
∣∣∣S˜c1 ⋂ S˜c2∣∣∣∣∣∣S˜c1 ⋃ S˜c2 ∣∣∣ (5)
Fig. 2 shows the class-wise path similarity in LeNet, un-
veiling the existence of path specialization: the averaged
similarity between two classes is low (around 0.5). On aver-
age, two classes activate about 50% common paths, as well
as 50% distinctive paths. We can also conjecture that the
degree of path specialization reflects the visual similarity
between the two classes. For example, in Fig. 2, digit ‘1’
has the highest degree of specialization (i.e., lowest path
similarity against other digits): its average similarity with
other classes is around 0.35 (compared to the 0.5 average
value). The reason is most likely attributed to its unique
shape. In contrast, digit ‘5’ and ‘8’ have the highest path
similarity of 0.6, also likely owing to their similar shapes.
We observe the existence of the path specialization in
other datasets and networks. Fig. 3 shows the path density
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Figure 4: Normal example and perturbations from different attacks. The perturbations are enhanced by 100 times to highlight
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Figure 5: (a) Path similarity for LeNet. (d-e): Distribution of per-layer similarity for AlexNet on ImageNet. Each line plot
represents the mean of each kind of adversarial examples’ similarity, with the same-color band around to show the standard
deviation. The dashed line split convolutional layers and FC layers. (b): Rank-1 similarity. (c): Rank-1 similarity delta. (d):
Rank-2 similarity. (e): Rank-2 similarity delta.
growth when merging per-class (ImageNet) paths for ResNet-
50. The growth of both weight and synapse follow the same
trend (weight density is greater owing to weight sharing).
The density increases rapidly initially, indicating the high
degree of path specialization. After 50 classes, the density
still increases but at a much slower pace. This matches the
class hierarchy in the ImageNet dataset, which has around
100 basic categories: different categories have a larger degree
of path specialization while classes in the same categories
have a smaller specialization degree.
In summary, we find the existence of path specialization
phenomenon in trained DNNs, which unveils that DNNs
activate different blocks when handling different classes.
Inspired by the observation, we study the possibility of using
the effective path to detect adversarial samples.
4. Adversarial Samples Defense
In this section, we study how to exploit the observed path
specialization phenomenon to detect adversarial samples.
Adversarial samples are generated by adding a small per-
turbation to normal images. The perturbation is small and
imperceptible by human beings but can lead to an incorrect
prediction of the neural network. We evaluate 6 different
attacks (i.e. methods to generate misleading perturbation for
a given input image), whose examples are shown in Fig. 4.
For each attack, we always choose the canonical im-
plementation. We use Foolbox [30] implementations
and its default parameters in version 1.3.2 for Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [13], Basic Iterative
Method(BIM) [18], DeepFool [24], Jacobian-based Saliency
Map Attack(JSMA) [28]. For Carlini and Wagner(C&W) at-
tacks [6], we use the open-source code released by the paper
authors. We use adversarial patch [4] implementation pro-
vided in CleverHans [27] and extend it to support AlexNet
without modification to its settings.
We first explore the distribution of effective path for nor-
mal and adversarial examples, and show that adversarial
images activate distinctive effective path to fool the DNN.
Our further analysis indicates that effective path similarity
provides a generic detection metric across all studied adver-
sarial attacks. Based on the analysis result, we propose a
low-dimensional and uniform metric to detect adversarial
samples from different kinds of attacks.
4.1. Adversarial Samples Similarity Analysis
On the basis of path specialization, we study the similarity
of the effective path between normal images and adversarial
images. We introduce another similarity metric called image-
class path similarity, which indicates how many synapses
in the image’s effective path come from the predicted class’s
effective path. It can be calculated as JP = J(S,S ∩ S˜p) =
|S ∩ S˜p|/|S|, where p is the image’s predicted class, S is the
synapse set of image effective path, and S˜p is the synapse
set of class p’s effective path. Because the per-class effective
path is far larger than the image’s effective path, their Jaccard
coefficient will be nearly zero. As such, the image-class path
similarity is essentially the Jaccard coefficient between the
image’s effective path and the intersection set of effective
path between the image and predicted class.
Fig. 5a shows the distribution of image-class path simi-
larity for both normal images and a rich set of adversarial
images in MNIST for LeNet. The similarity values for nor-
mal images are almost all 1, and note that they are not used
in the training and per-class path extraction. In contrast, the
similarity values for adversarial images are mostly smaller
than 1, indicating effective path as a great metric to distin-
guish between normal and adversarial images.
For deeper and more complicated DNNs, we breakdown
the image-class path similarity metric to different layers. It
can be calculated as J lP = |Sl ∩ S˜lp|/|Sl| for layer l. Fig. 5b
compares the per-layer similarity for normal images (from
test set) and adversarial images on AlexNet, and show that
normal images demonstrate a higher similarity degree than
adversarial images. We further calculate the similarity delta,
which equals to the similarity value of a normal image minus
the similarity value of its corresponding adversarial image.
Fig. 5c shows that all adversarial attacks cause almost iden-
tical similarity decrease pattern, where the largest decrease
occurs in the middle layers, i.e. boundary between convolu-
tional layers and fully connected layers.
Recall that we extract the effective path starting from
the predicted class, i.e. rank-1 class, which we call rank-1
effective path. We also study the rank-2 effective path which
starts from the rank-2 class. Fig. 5d compares the rank-2
effective path similarity for normal and adversarial images.
Different from the rank-1 effective path, adversarial images
demonstrate a higher similarity degree than normal images.
The reason is that the predicted rank-2 class for an adver-
sarial image is often the rank-1 class of its corresponding
normal image (i.e. without adding the perturbation). In
comparison, the predicted rank-2 class for a normal image
has no such relationship, and therefore has a lower degree
of similarity than adversarial image. Moreover, different
adversarial attack methods cause a similar pattern as Fig. 5e
shows.
In summary, extending class-wise path similarity to the
image-class case opens the door of using effective path to
detect adversarial images: mainstream adversarial attacks
modify the normally inactive path to fool the DNN and their
impact indicates a uniform pattern. In the next subsection,
we propose a simple and highly interpretable method to
exploit these observations for detecting adversarial samples.
4.2. Defense Model
Based on the per-layer similarity analysis, we propose
to use the rank-1 and rank-2 effective path similarity to
detect adversarial samples. We study four different detection
models, including linear model, random forest, AdaBoost,
and gradient boosting. Among them, the linear model is the
simplest one with the strongest interpretability. As we will
show later, the linear model also achieves similar accuracy
of other more complex models, proving that the selected
input features (effective path similarity values) are strong
indicators for detecting adversarial images.
Linear Model For the linear model, we propose jointed
similarity as the defense metric. It can be calculated as
J˜P =
∑L
l=1 ω
lJ lP −
∑L
l=1 ω
l′J lP
′, where J lP and J
l
P
′ are
respectively rank-1 and rank-2 similarity for layer l, ωl and
ωl
′ are their coefficients that satisfy ωl ≥ 0, ωl′ ≥ 0. The
joint similarity reflects the low rank-1 similarity degree and
high rank-2 similarity degree of adversarial images. An
image is detected as an adversarial image if its joint similarity
is less than a threshold. The simple linear model avoids
overfitting and offers strong interpretability.
We use LeNet-5 on MNIST, AlexNet on ImageNet and
ResNet-50 v2 on ImageNet for evaluation. For each dataset,
effective path extraction is performed on the overall training
set with θ = 0.5. For each model, adversarial examples from
all evaluated attacks are aggregated, shuffled and split into
10% for the training of joint similarity’s coefficients and 90%
for defense performance evaluation. Notice that we only
generate adversarial examples for the first test image in each
class of ImageNet due to the significant computational cost.
The training of joint similarity’s coefficients is performed by
SGD running 10000 epochs, with elastic-net regularization
(l1 ratio is 0.5) for sparsity.
Other Models We also study to use other more complex
models, including random forest, AdaBoost, and gradient
boosting. These three approaches are also used to construct
models based on CDRPs [37]. However, our input features
for those approaches are a vector formed by each layer’s
rank-1 and rank-2 effective path similarity while prior work’s
input features have a much larger dimension (e.g. 1152 for
AlexNet and 15104 for ResNet-50). For sake of consistency,
we apply the same adversarial example preprocessing with
the linear model. We use 100 estimators for random forest
and gradient boosting, while AdaBoost is limited to 50 es-
timators. All unmentioned configurations of these models
stay the same with the default values in scikit-learn v0.19.2.
5. Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the adversarial sample de-
tection accuracy based on effective path. We first focus on
the highly interpretable linear detection model and show its
detection performance on a wide range of different attacks,
datasets, and models. We then compare our approach with
prior work CDRP [37] and show that our approach achieves
better accuracy, requires less training samples, and general-
izes well to different types of adversarial attacks.
5.1. Linear Model
We first evaluate the detection accuracy of the linear
model in Sec. 4.2 for a wide range of adversarial attacks.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
False Positive Rate
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
DeepFool (AUC = 0.91)
FGSM (AUC = 0.95)
BIM (AUC = 0.94)
JSMA (AUC = 0.95)
CWL2 (AUC = 0.92)
(a) LeNet.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
False Positive Rate
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
DeepFool (AUC = 0.85)
FGSM (AUC = 0.86)
BIM (AUC = 0.82)
JSMA (AUC = 0.85)
CWL2 (AUC = 0.86)
(b) AlexNet.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
False Positive Rate
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
DeepFool (AUC = 0.89)
FGSM (AUC = 0.88)
BIM (AUC = 0.82)
JSMA (AUC = 0.89)
CWL2 (AUC = 0.89)
(c) ResNet-50.
Figure 6: Detection results for LeNet (on MNIST), AlexNet
(on ImageNet), and ResNet-50 with joint similarity.
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Figure 7: Linear model detection results for AlexNet on
different attack methods.
Non-targeted Attacks We evaluate non-targeted attacks,
which are free to use any class as the adversarial image’s
inference result, with three different norms: FGSM and BIM
with l∞ norm, DeepFool and C&W l2 (CWL2) attack with
l2 norm, and JSMA with l0 norm. For LeNet, we achieves an
area under the curve (AUC) value up to 0.95 in Fig. 6a. Even
the lowest AUC value is 0.92, because of significant path
similarity distinction between adversarial and normal images
of MNIST. On ImageNet, we achieve AUC of 0.85~0.86
for AlexNet and AUC of 0.88~0.89 for ResNet-50, which
has more layers to provide richer information for detection,
leading to better accuracy. The BIM has a low AUC value
of 0.82. The reason is that BIM iteratively modifies all
pixels (Fig. 4), which makes its rank-2 effective path behave
slightly different from other attacks.
Targeted Attack Targeted attacks are designed to mislead
the prediction to a specific target class. Fig. 7a shows the
result of evaluating targeted C&W l2 attack for AlexNet. We
achieve AUC of 0.94, which is better than the non-targeted
version. It is reasonable since the targeted attack’s stricter
constraint for target class requires larger perturbation, which
eases our detection.
Universal Perturbation Attack Universal perturbation at-
tacks generate perturbations that fool models on a large range
of examples. Adversarial Patch [4] is an attack that generates
universal perturbations in the form of image patches, which
is robust against patch transformations such as translations,
rotations or scaling. The result of adversarial patches in
Fig. 7b indicates that the detection becomes more accurate
when the patch becomes larger. Our method can reach AUC
of 0.9 when the patch scale relative to image size rises to
0.5.
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path and CDRP. Note that the four bars in an attack type
represent linear model, AdaBoost, gradient boosting, and
random forest in order. The blue bars indicate the AUC delta
between our work and CDRP, no matter which is higher. Our
work outperforms CDRP except on the linear model for the
patch and random attack.
Unrecognizable Examples Adversarial examples are usu-
ally human-recognizable, however, unrecognizable images
can also fool neural networks [26]. We find that effective
path can also be used to detect unrecognizable examples
by evaluated on LeNet and AlexNet. For LeNet, our detec-
tor can recognize 93.85% randomly generated images. For
AlexNet, our method achieves AUC of 0.91 as shown in
Fig. 7c. In this sense, effective path offers the DNNs the
ability to identify its recognizable inputs’ distribution.
To summarize, the simple linear model constructed with
effective path achieves high detection accuracy without re-
quiring attack-specific knowledge.
5.2. Comparison with Prior Work
We now compare effective path based detection with prior
work CDRP [37] with the linear model as well as three
different kinds of models described in Sec. 4.2.
Detection Accuracy Fig. 17 compares the detection accu-
racy between effective path based models and CDRP based
models. For both approaches, we find that random forest
performs the best while the linear model performs worst
among all models. However, the effective path approach
has a much smaller gap between random forest and linear
model than the CDRP approach. With the exception of patch
and random attack, the effective path based linear model can
outperform the CDRP based random forest model. In partic-
ular, the accuracy improvements for our approach are much
more significant for the first five attack methods that are non-
targeted and smaller for the two targeted attack method in the
middle. Note that the effective path based linear model per-
forms slightly worse on the patch and random attack, which
generate much different perturbation patterns (see Fig. 4).
Training Size We also study how the size of the training
set impacts the detection accuracy. We choose the linear
model and random forest model and gradually increase their
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Figure 9: Impact of training set size on the AUC.
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Figure 10: Impact of attack number in the training set.
training set size. Fig. 18 compares our approach with the
CDRP approach. For the linear model, our approach sta-
bilizes with a small number of training samples (around
100 images) while the CDRP requires much larger training
set size. For the random forest model, both approaches re-
quire a larger training set while our approach is less sensitive
because our input feature is low dimensional and effective.
Generalizability Generalizability measures a defense’s
ability to withstand unknown attacks. To study the gen-
eralizability of our detection model, we perform a control
experiment: we gradually add the adversarial samples from
different attack types for training the detection model and
observe the model detection accuracy all on attack types.
Fig. 19 shows the experiment results where we add the ad-
versarial samples in the order of legend shown in the right.
For both linear model and random forest model, our work
generalizes well to unseen attacks because effective path cap-
tures their common behavior. The CDRP based linear model
performs worse for all non-targeted attacks, and its accuracy
on targeted attack (FGSM_targeted and CWL2_targeted)
shows an abrupt increase once incorporating the correspond-
ing samples for training the model.
5.3. Sensitivity Study
After demonstrating the accuracy of using effective path
to detect adversarial samples, we now perform sensitivity
study on its parameters, including the θ in Equation 1 and
the number of extracted layers. Our results further unveil op-
timization opportunity to make effective path more practical.
Parameter Sensitivity The first tunable parameter of ef-
fective path extraction is θ. We test C&W l2 attack with θ
value varying from 0.1 to 1.0 in Fig. 11a. The detection per-
formance remains almost unchanged when θ is in range of
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Figure 11: Effective path θ sensitivity study.
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Figure 12: Effective path layer number impact on AUC.
Table 1: Effective path extraction time (second).
Method Effective Path (Full) Effective Path (Partial) CDRP
AlexNet 1.43 ± 0.09 0.43 ± 0.17 106.4 ± 5.2
ResNet-50 68.32 ± 2.43 0.83 ± 0.21 406.3 ± 6.3
0.5 and 1.0, and decreases from θ = 0.3. Fig. 11b shows that
the effective path size under θ = 0.3 decrease by one order
of magnitude compared with θ = 1.0, with slightly lower
detection accuracy. We choose θ = 0.5 as default value
to save storage space and improve extraction performance
without accuracy loss.
Layer Sensitivity Another tunable parameter of effective
path extraction is the number of layers as it is extracted layer
by layer. We perform experiments to study the layer num-
ber’s impact on the adversarial sample detection accuracy
and show the result in Fig. 20. Note that we extract the effec-
tive path starting from the last layer and the last three layers
are fully connected layers in AlexNet. For both linear model
and random forest, we observe that the AUC performance
for all attacks except random attack saturates after three lay-
ers, i.e. FC layers. The random attack detection accuracy
saturates after four layers, i.e. one additional CONV layer.
With the layer sensitivity insight, we can extract effective
path for just enough layers instead of the full network, which
can significantly reduce the extraction time. Tbl. 1 compares
the extraction time for AlexNet and ResNet-50. Extracting
the full effective path for the entire network is still much
less expensive (70× for AlexNet and 6× for ResNet-50)
than extracting CDRP which requires the retraining process.
Moreover, extracting the partial effective path can lead to
even faster process time, which translate to 240× and 500×
Table 2: Comparison with other defenses.
Type Defense l0 l2 l∞ Attack Generalizability Scale
Detector
Effective Path Y Y Y all discussed strong ImageNet
[23] - Y Y (non-)targeted weak CIFAR-10
[22] - Y Y (non-)targeted - CIFAR-10
[37] - - Y targeted - ImageNet
Adversarial [21] - Y Y (non-)targeted weak CIFAR-10
Training [25] - - Y (non-)targeted weak CIFAR-10
Input [14] - Y Y (non-)targeted - ImageNet
Transformation [5] - - Y (non-)targeted - CIFAR-100
Randomization
[39] - Y Y (non-)targeted - ImageNet
[8] - - Y (non-)targeted - CIFAR-10
Generative [32] Y Y Y (non-)targeted + random strong MNIST
Model [31] - Y Y (non-)targeted - MNIST
time reduction compared to CDRP extraction.
In summary, effective path enables the use of the highly
interpretable linear model to detect a broad range of adver-
sarial attacks, and can achieve great accuracy on different
datasets and models. Compared to prior work CDRP [37],
our approach achieves better accuracy, requires less training
samples, and generalizes well to different adversarial attacks.
6. Related Work
To compare our defense method with prior work, we first
categorize various defenses methods to the five types listed
in Tbl. 2. Since almost all the compared work reported a sim-
ilar detection accuracy (AUC value 0.9 - 0.95), we focus the
comparison on the comprehensiveness, attack method, gener-
alizability, and scale of their evaluation. The "-" in the table
indicates that there are not enough details or experimental
results to deduce an appropriate conclusion.
Detector Our work fits in the detector category, which
does not require any modification to inputs, models, or train-
ing process. Prior work [23] trained a DNN from network
activations to detect adversarial examples. The detector
subnetwork doesn’t generalize well across different attack
parameters or attack types because the activation values are
highly attack-specific, which motivates [22] to propose Mag-
Net. MagNet uses a reformer to move adversarial examples
to normal examples’ manifold. However, [7] shows that
MagNet can be defeated by a little increase of perturbation.
The closest work to ours is [37], which uses the im-
portance coefficients of different channels in the network
(named critical data routing paths, abbr. CDRPs) to detect
adversarial examples. However, CDRPs do not have ag-
gregation capability as a single channel can have different
significance values for different images. As such, CDRPs
fail to defend non-targeted attacks and have weak general-
izability. In comparison, we use the effective path, which
is essentially a binary value for each neuron/synapse, and
therefore can be directly aggregated. Our method generalizes
well for different attacks and provides strong transferability.
Adversarial Training Adversarial training requires addi-
tional training step to protect the DNNs. It has two known
disadvantages: it is difficult to perform in the large-scale
dataset like ImageNet [19], at the same time easy to overfit
to the trained kinds of adversarial examples. Even adversar-
ial training proposed by [21], considered as the only effective
defense among white-box-secure defenses at ICLR 2018 [2],
is found overfitting on the trained l∞ metric [33].
Input Transformation Many image transformations like
rescaling, bit-depth reduction and compression can disturb
attacks and increase the perturbation lower bound, with the
sacrifice of classification accuracy. This kind of defense
method works less well for patch-based attacks and does not
provide the ability to filter unrecognizable examples.
Randomization Randomization-based defense methods
apply random modifications to model weights. They can
increase required distortion by forcing attacks to generate
transferable adversarial examples over a series of possible
modified models. However, they also stochastically alter the
prediction results, leading to the overhead of more forward
passes or retraining steps.
Generative Model Generative model based defenses
change the classification model. They project the inputs
onto the manifold before classification. [32] propose a classi-
fication model that shows good generality and transferability
on MNIST, but its performance on large dataset like Ima-
geNet is still obscure. GAN-based defenses are also hard to
apply in ImageNet scale due to its computational cost.
7. Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we propose a novel profiling based method
to extract the deep neural network’s (DNN) path information
when inferring an image. This method does not modify the
DNN structure and can extract meaningful path information
that represents the critical dataflow inside the DNN. We study
how to use the extracted path information to decompose a
DNN model into different functional blocks corresponding
to different inference classes. Through analysis, we find that
adversarial images can activate functional blocks different
from normal images to fool the DNN’s prediction results
because all the blocks are connected. We propose a defense
method that only uses the information from the training set
and the image itself, without requiring any knowledge of a
specific attack. The defense method achieves high accuracy
and broad coverage of mainstream attacks.
Besides adversarial defense, the effective path can also
be used to understand the DNN’s working mechanism. In
the appendix, we report our preliminary result on how the
training process and different DNN topology affects the
effective path density and similarity. We believe that the
functionality based decomposition is a promising direction
for understanding DNNs.
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A. Effective Path Extraction for More Network
Structures
For the sake of brevity, we only introduce effective path extraction for
networks consist of convolutional layers and FC layers in the submitted
paper. We further explain other common network structures’ extraction
methods in this section.
Skip Connection To handle skip connections in ResNet, we need
to merge neurons contributed from two different layers. Consider a skip
connection from layer l to layer l + m, then active neurons in layer l
are collected from layer l + 1 and l + m, denoted as N l = {nlk|k ∈
K˜l+1 or k ∈ K˜l+m}, where K˜l+1 and K˜l+m are the selected sets of
weight indices in layer l + 1 and l +m respectively.
Pooling Layer Pooling layers can be treated as the special case of
convolutional layers during extracting. For average pooling layer, we treat
it as a convolutional layer with all weights equal to 1; for max pooling layer,
we treat it as a convolutional layer that always picks rank-1 weight and
input neuron pair when finding the minimum K˜lp.
B. Effective Path Visualization for CIFAR-100
To explore path specialization on more realistic dataset than LeNet, we
study the similarity of per-class effective paths on CIFAR-100. Fig. 13
shows the class-wise path similarity of 15 classes in CIFAR-100, which are
belonged to three different super classes. We show super classes vehicles 1,
large natural outdoor scenes and flowers from left to right, each of which
contains 5 basic classes. We can find that classes belong to the same super
classes have higher similarity than classes from different super classes,
which indicates that effective path discovers the class hierarchy without
prior knowledge of super classes.
C. Adversarial Samples Defense
C.1. Adversarial Samples Similarity Analysis for
ResNet-50
Per-layer similarity distribution for ResNet-50 on ImageNet is shown
in Fig. 14. Similar to AlexNet, adversarial images lead to lower rank-
1 similarity and higher rank-2 similarity compared with normal images.
Furthermore, corresponding to AlexNet’s FC layers, the largest similarity
delta is also located in last several layers.
C.2. Weight-based Defense Model
For adversarial detection, we can use information from model weights
as alternative of synapses. By calculating image-class path similarity from
weights in effective path instead, i.e., let J lP = |Wl ∩W˜lp|/|Wl| for layer
l, we obtain weight-based joint similarity. The detection result using weight-
based defense metric for AlexNet is shown in Fig. 16, which indicates that
it achieves as high accuracy as the synapse-based metric.
C.3. Adversarial Sample Visualization
In this section, we use t-SNE to visualize effective path similarity and
CDRP, which provide an intuitive way to show the adversarial sample detec-
tion ability of both methods. For consistency with our defense model, we
use rank-1 and rank-2 effective path similarity as input features of t-SNE.
Fig. 15a and Fig. 15b show the t-SNE 2D embedding of effective path
similarity and CDRP on AlexNet respectively. For our method, random
images are in two dissociative clusters. In the cluster contains all other
images, original images are located in the edge of right side of the cluster,
which is partly separable with other adversarial images. Adversarial images
from untargeted attacks locate in the nearest area beside original examples,
which is coincident with the fact that untargeted ones contain the smallest
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Figure 13: Class-wise path similarity for CIFAR-100.
perturbations among these adversarial examples. On the other hand, ad-
versarial images from targeted attacks and patch attack are far away from
original images. All the above shows that effective path similarity catches
the difference between normal images and adversarial images from multiple
attacks. For CDRP, the location of original images and adversarial images
from untargeted attacks are almost co-located, which indicates that it fails
to catch the difference between them and leads to its low detection accuracy
of untargeted attacks. Fig. 15c shows the t-SNE 2D embedding of effective
path similarity on ResNet-50. The boundary between original images and
adversarial images is fuzzier than that on AlexNet, but original images still
have different distribution compared with adversarial images.
D. Evaluation on ResNet-50
In this section, we show further evaluation results on ResNet-50 which
is not included in the submitted paper.
D.1. Detection Accuracy
Fig. 17 shows the detection accuracy of effective path under different
defense models. For all of the mentioned attacks, we find that random
forest performs the best while the linear model performs worst among
all models. However, the gap between random forest and linear model
is very small, which indicates that effective path can achieve comparable
detection performance using simple and highly interpretable way on deep
and complex networks like ResNet-50.
D.2. Training Size
We choose the linear model and random forest model as representations
to study how the size of the training set impacts the detection accuracy on
ResNet-50. Fig. 18 shows the difference between the simple linear model
and complex random forest model. For the linear model, the detection
accuracy stabilizes with a small number of training samples (around 400
images). For the random forest model, the detector requires much larger
training set (around 2500 images), meanwhile achieves much better detec-
tion accuracy, which indicates that random forest model can utilize more
features in the effective path. Compared with AlexNet, both linear model
and random forest model requires more training samples to be stable, which
can be attributed to the fact that ResNet-50 has much more layers than
AlexNet that provide useful features for detection.
D.3. Generalizability
Fig. 19 shows the experiment results of generalizability on ResNet-
50 when adding the adversarial samples in the order of legend shown
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Figure 14: Distribution of per-layer similarity for ResNet-50 on ImageNet. Each line plot represents the mean of each kind of
adversarial examples’ similarity, with the same-color band around to show the standard deviation. The dashed lines indicate
that down-sampling is performed in the next layer.
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Figure 15: t-SNE 2D embedding of original images and adversarial images from different attacks. Each point stands for an
image. The first two pictures show results on AlexNet, while the last one show effective path’s result on ResNet-50. For
brevity, FGSM, BIM, JSMA, DeepFool, and CWL2 are grouped into untargeted attacks. Targeted version of FGSM and
CWL2 are also grouped into targeted attacks.
in the right. For both linear model and random forest model, our work
generalizes well to unseen attacks because effective path captures their
common behavior. Compared with AlexNet, our method achieves the same
level of generalizability on much more complex networks.
D.4. Layer Sensitivity
We study the layer number’s impact on the adversarial sample detection
accuracy on ResNet-50 and show the result in Fig. 20. For both linear
model and random forest, we observe that the AUC performance for all
attacks saturates within 10 layers, which is a small portion of the whole
50 layers. This layer sensitivity insight leads to the significant speedup of
extraction by only extracting just enough layers instead of all layers, which
is described in the submitted paper.
E. Further Study of Neural Network Inter-
pretability
We further study how the training process and different network struc-
ture impacts the path specialization. In the next, we study how the training
process and different network structures impact the path specialization.
E.1. Training Process
We study how the training process transforms a randomized network to
the final state from the perspective of the effective path. Specifically, we
extract the effective path for each class at different training stages. Through
the analysis, we find that the training process contains three distinctive
phases with different path’s density and similarity trend, which share similar
insights from the previous work using information bottleneck theory to
explain training process [38].
Fig. 21 shows training process for ResNet. We choose different stages
in training and show the class-wise path similarity in the form of box-plot,
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Figure 17: Detection accuracy comparison under different
defense models.
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Figure 18: Impact of training set size on the AUC.
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Figure 19: Impact of attack number in the training set.
on top of which we also overlay the path density and prediction accuracy.
In the first phase, the density of synapses and weights in the effective paths
stays the same while their similarity increases. In the beginning, the network
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Figure 20: Effective path layer number impact on AUC.
is in a randomized state and simply tries to memorize the input data.
In the second phase, the density of both synapses and weights decrease
rapidly. The similarity of the synapses stays relatively the same while the
similarity of weights decreases. In this phase, the network mainly performs
compression, and the path specialization mainly manifests in the form of
weights. In other words, the network tries to use class-specific features
extracted by different convolutional filters to increase the specialization
degree.
In the third phase, the synapse density stops to decrease but weight den-
sity starts to increase. Meanwhile, weight similarity continues to decrease.
In this phase, the network compression stops and mainly relies on path
specialization (via weight) to increase the prediction accuracy. The path
specialization even causes the weight density increases a bit.
In summary, we find that the training process contains mainly three
phases, the first two of which conforms to the memorization and compres-
sion phase identified by the prior work [38]. The second phase performs
compression (less density) and path specialization (less similarity), while
the third phase mainly includes the path specialization. After these phases,
the network is transformed into a state with sparse and distinctive paths
with great inference capability.
E.2. Network Structure
After establishing the effective path as a great indicator of the neural
network’s inference performance, we study how the network structure
affects the effective path characteristics.
Fig. 22 shows the per-layer path density in LeNet. We observe the first
convolutional layer has a much higher density compared to the following
layers, which matches with the established knowledge that the shallow
layers in a CNN extract high-level features that are shared by different
classes.
CNN designers have found using a deeper network can increase the
prediction accuracy to a certain degree. However, the accuracy stops to
increase after a certain number of layers owing to the vanishing gradient in
the training process. As such, the ResNet structure with skip connection
was proposed to overcome this difficulty. Fig. 23 shows the per-layer
path density for ResNet-50. Not only the first two layers still have higher
density, but also layers before a skip connection also have high density. This
suggests that skip connection helps not only the gradient propagation but
also the effective paths formation. In the end, ResNet is able to converge
and achieve great prediction performance.
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Figure 21: Effective path’s density and class-wise path similarity in the training process.
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Figure 22: Per-layer density of effec-
tive paths in LeNet.
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Figure 23: Per-layer density of effective paths in ResNet-50. Layers in ResNet-50 is
organized into 3-layer bottleneck blocks, which is split by dashed lines.
